Redmond, Paul
(2014)
Essays on the Political Economy of
Elections.
PhD thesis, National University of Ireland Maynooth.
Abstract
Elected politicians work as agents on behalf of the citizens of an economy.
Once elected they are responsible for shaping the future socioeconomic path
of a country. Therefore understanding the determinants of electoral outcomes
and the incentives faced by political candidates during the election period
is key in understanding the efficacy of elections in selecting the best possi-
ble candidates. A functional electoral system should act as a quality filter
in which low quality candidates are "weeded out" and the highest quality
candidates are successful.
In reality electoral systems may not select and retain the best possible
candidates. The presence of incumbency advantage may lead to a dysfunc-
tional system with deleterious effects for welfare. Incumbent candidates may
use officeholder benefits to improve their electoral prospects. For exam-
ple, incumbents typically have access to free postage, printing and greater
fundraising capabilities than challengers and may use these officeholder ben-
efits to gain an unfair electoral advantage. As a result, the incumbent could
win the election even if the challenger is of higher quality or high quality chal-
lengers may decide not to contest the election in the first place. Incumbents
are also in a position to announce their policy choices before challengers. As
such the incumbent may enjoy a first mover advantage which may enable the
incumbent to implement their own personal policy agenda which may not
represent the majority of voters.
The first chapter of this dissertation empirically estimates the magnitude
of the incumbency advantage in Irish elections using a regression disconti-
nuity design (RDD). Ireland provides an interesting setting for the study of
incumbency advantage as the rate of reelection of Irish politicians is one of
the highest in the world. Moreover its electoral system of proportional repre-
sentation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV) creates strong incentives
for incumbent candidates to cultivate a loyal personal following. In very
close elections, where there is a narrow margin of victory, it is likely that
bare winners are comparable in their unobservable characteristics to bare
losers. Regression discontinuity design identifies the causal effect of incum-
bency by comparing the subsequent electoral outcomes of bare winners and
losers. I find that incumbency causes an eighteen percentage point increase
in the probability that a candidate is successful in a subsequent election.
In chapter two I study open seat and incumbent-challenger elections in
a model of spatial electoral competition between two policy motivated can-
didates. The candidates differ with regard to non-policy related characteris-
tics which are desired by voters. These may include characteristics such as
charisma, charm and intelligence - collectively referred to as valence charac-
teristics. I find that incumbent candidates benefit from being first movers
and this allows them to generate favourable post-election policy outcomes.
Policy divergence between candidates is typically greater in the incumbent
challenger election compared to an open seat contest. I also show that ideo-
logical shirking occurs once a candidate's valence exceeds a certain threshold
as the candidate pursues her own ideology even if this is not representative
of the majority of voters.
In chapter three I examine the extent to which electoral selection based
on candidate quality alone can account for the pattern of reelection rates
in the U.S. Senate. In order to attain incumbency status a candidate has
to first win an election. Therefore it is likely that incumbent candidates
are of high quality due to political selection and get reelected with a high
probability. As such high reelection rates are not definitive evidence of a
poorly functioning electoral system. The counterfactual simulation in which
candidate quality is the sole determinant of electoral success may provide
a simple benchmark for the reelection rate in the absence of officeholder
benefits. The simulation delivers a reelection rate which is almost identical
to the observed rate prior to 1980, at around 78 percent. In the later sub-
sample, quality-based selection generates a reelection rate which is seven
percentage points lower than observed. The divergence in the reelection rates
in the later sub-sample is consistent with the findings of vote-margin studies
that indicate rising incumbency advantage due to officeholder benefits.
| Item Type: |
Thesis
(PhD)
|
| Keywords: |
Political Economy; Elections; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: |
5610 |
| Depositing User: |
IR eTheses
|
| Date Deposited: |
12 Dec 2014 15:07 |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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