Rousseau, Fabrice and Boco, Hervé and Germain, Laurent (2014) Heterogeneous Beliefs and Imperfect Competition in Sequential Auction Markets. Working Paper. National University of Ireland Maynooth. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

This paper analyzes a multi-auction setting in which informed strategic agents are endowed with heterogeneous noisy signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset. One result is that when the variance of the noise is small the competition between traders takes the form of a rat race during all the periods of trading. As we increase the level of the noise in the traders' signals, a waiting game phase appears and the intensity of the rat race, observed only at the last auctions, decreases. In sharp contrast with the previous literature, when the variance of the noise is very large, we only observe a waiting game

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Keywords:	effciency; asymmetric information; noise; liquidity; adverse selection; competition;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	5688
Depositing User:	Ms Sandra Doherty
Date Deposited:	19 Jan 2015 10:27
Publisher:	National University of Ireland Maynooth
URI:
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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