Byrne, Julie and O'Connor, Thomas G.
(2012)
Creditor
rights
and
the
outcome
model
of
dividends.
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 52 (2).
pp. 227-242.
ISSN 1062-9769
Abstract
Using
a
sample
of
22,374
firms
from
35
countries,
we
examine
the
role
of
creditor
rights,
shareholder
rights,
and
corporate
governance
in
determining
corporate
dividend
policy.
We
find
that,
while
all
three
variables
play
a
significant
role
in
determining
both
the
likelihood
and
the
dividend
amount,
the
effect
of
country-level
creditor
rights
dominate.
In
subsequent
analysis,
we
show
that
the
outcome
model
is
most
effective
in
countries
with
strong
creditor
rights.
When
creditor
rights
are
weak,
creditors
demand,
and
firms
consent
to
lower
dividends.
These
findings
show
that
creditors,
and
not
shareholders,
exert
the
greatest
influence
over
corporate
dividend
policy
Item Type: |
Article
|
Keywords: |
Dividend policy; Creditor rights; Shareholder rights; Corporate governance; |
Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
Item ID: |
5721 |
Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2012.04.002 |
Depositing User: |
Thomas G. O'Connor
|
Date Deposited: |
22 Jan 2015 17:40 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance |
Publisher: |
Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign |
Refereed: |
Yes |
URI: |
|
Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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