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    Is Consciousness Computable? Quantifying Integrated Information Using Algorithmic Information Theory


    Maguire, Phil and Moser, Philippe and Maguire, Rebecca and Griffith, Virgil (2014) Is Consciousness Computable? Quantifying Integrated Information Using Algorithmic Information Theory. Working Paper. arXiv.

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    Abstract

    In this article we review Tononi’s (2008) theory of consciousness as integrated information. We argue that previous formalizations of integrated information (e.g. Griffith, 2014) depend on information loss. Since lossy integration would necessitate continuous damage to existing memories, we propose it is more natural to frame consciousness as a lossless integrative process and provide a formalization of this idea using algorithmic information theory. We prove that complete lossless integration requires noncomputable functions. This result implies that if unitary consciousness exists, it cannot be modelled computationally.

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Additional Information: Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society
    Keywords: Consciousness; integrated information; synergy; data compression; modularity of mind;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Science and Engineering > Mathematics and Statistics
    Item ID: 6267
    Identification Number: arXiv:1405.0126
    Depositing User: Philippe Moser
    Date Deposited: 17 Jul 2015 14:00
    Publisher: arXiv
    URI:
    Use Licence: This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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