Speller, Ian (2002) Delayed Reaction: UK Maritime Expeditionary Capabilities and the Lessons of the Falklands Conflict. Defense and Security Analysis, 18 (4). pp. 1-16.
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Abstract
On 2 April 1982 Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands and the next day they occupied South Georgia. The small British garrisons based in both of these locations put up a spirited defense but were forced to capitulate in the face of overwhelming numbers. The Falkland Islands are situated in the South Atlantic, 400 miles to the west of Argentina and 8,000 miles southwest of the United Kingdom (UK). There are two main islands, West Falkland and East Falkland and the only town of any size, Port Stanley, is situated on the latter. South Georgia lies 800 miles to the south-east of the Falklands. To the apparent surprise of the Argentinean ruling Junta, the British dispatched a maritime task force to the South Atlantic intent on restoring British administration to the islands. The first ships of this task force sailed from the UK on 5 April. By 25 April British forces had recaptured South Georgia and on 14 June the Royal Marine commanding British land forces in the Falklands, Major-General Jeremy Moore, accepted the surrender of all Argentine forces in the Islands.
Item Type: | Article |
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Keywords: | UK Maritime; Capabilities; Expeditionary; Falklands; Conflict; |
Academic Unit: | Faculty of Arts,Celtic Studies and Philosophy > History |
Item ID: | 844 |
Depositing User: | Ian Speller |
Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2007 |
Journal or Publication Title: | Defense and Security Analysis |
Publisher: | Routledge |
Refereed: | Yes |
URI: | |
Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
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