Leahy, Dermot
(2004)
Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy.
Economics Letters, 82 (3).
pp. 409-414.
ISSN 0165-1765
Abstract
We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove
that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the
implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases.
Item Type: |
Article
|
Keywords: |
Export subsidies; R&D subsidies; Social cost of funds; Strategic trade policy; |
Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
Item ID: |
8466 |
Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.019 |
Depositing User: |
Dermot Leahy
|
Date Deposited: |
18 Jul 2017 11:24 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
Economics Letters |
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Refereed: |
Yes |
URI: |
|
Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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