Leahy, Dermot (2004) Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility. Journal of International Economics, 64. pp. 195-209. ISSN 0022-1996

Preview

Download (196kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ investment decisions. Firms’ investment timing is endogenous and can be manipulated by the home government, which sets a subsidy before firms decide when to invest. We show that when the government wishes to manipulate investment timing, it will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign firm.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Demand uncertainty; Strategic commitment; Flexibility; Trade policy; Commitment deterrence;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	8467
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00082-5
Depositing User:	Dermot Leahy
Date Deposited:	18 Jul 2017 11:37
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of International Economics
Publisher:	Elsevier
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	https://www.elsevier.com/
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

Repository Staff Only(login required)

Item control page

Downloads

Origin of downloads