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    Follow-my-leader FDI and tacit collusion

    Leahy, Dermot (2003) Follow-my-leader FDI and tacit collusion. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21. pp. 439-453. ISSN 0167-7187

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    This paper presents a simple model to illustrate the following idea: domestic rivals may be motivated to set up foreign production in the same country because the replication of each other’s foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitates collusive behaviour in the market in which they compete. This implies positive interdependence between firms’ FDI decisions, i.e. foreign investment by one firm brings increased incentive for others to follow suit.

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Tacit collusion; Oligopoly;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 8468
    Depositing User: Dermot Leahy
    Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2017 12:08
    Journal or Publication Title: International Journal of Industrial Organization
    Publisher: Elsevier
    Refereed: Yes
    Use Licence: This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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