O'Connor, Thomas G.
(2012)
Investability, corporate governance and firm value.
Research in International Business and Finance, 26 (1).
pp. 120-136.
ISSN 0275-5319
Abstract
In this paper, I show that “investable premia” are greatest for transparent,
well-governed firms. I find that single-class share investable
firms and better-governed firms reap the largest valuation gains
from becoming investable. Dual-class share firms do gain from
becoming investable, but their gains are much lower than that
of single-class share firms. These findings suggest that the failure
on the part of firms to remedy agency conflicts prior to becoming
investable only serves to greatly reduce, or even nullify their
“investable premia”.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Keywords: |
Investability;
Corporate governance;
Tobin’s q; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: |
8837 |
| Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2011.09.001 |
| Depositing User: |
Thomas G. O'Connor
|
| Date Deposited: |
20 Sep 2017 09:46 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
Research in International Business and Finance |
| Publisher: |
Elsevier |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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