Flanagan, Brian (2013) Analyticity and the Deviant Logician: Williamson’s Argument from Disagreement. Acta Analytica, 28 (3). pp. 345-352. ISSN 0353-5150

Preview

Download (121kB) | Preview

Abstract

One way to discredit the suggestion that a statement is true just in virtue of its meaning is to observe that its truth is the subject of genuine disagreement. By appealing to the case of the unorthodox philosopher, Timothy Williamson has recast this response as an argument foreclosing any appeal to analyticity. Reconciling Quine’s epistemological holism with his treatment of the ‘deviant logician’, I show that we may discharge the demands of charitable interpretation even while attributing trivial semantic error to Williamson’s philosophers. Williamson’s effort to generalize the argument from disagreement therefore fails.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Analyticity; Disagreement; Epistemological holism; Williamson, Timothy Quine; Willard Van Orman;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Law
Item ID:	8917
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0172-2
Depositing User:	Brian Flanagan
Date Deposited:	18 Oct 2017 14:08
Journal or Publication Title:	Acta Analytica
Publisher:	Springer
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	https://link.springer.com
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

Repository Staff Only(login required)

Item control page

Downloads

Origin of downloads