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    Analyticity and the Deviant Logician: Williamson’s Argument from Disagreement

    Flanagan, Brian (2013) Analyticity and the Deviant Logician: Williamson’s Argument from Disagreement. Acta Analytica, 28 (3). pp. 345-352. ISSN 0353-5150

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    One way to discredit the suggestion that a statement is true just in virtue of its meaning is to observe that its truth is the subject of genuine disagreement. By appealing to the case of the unorthodox philosopher, Timothy Williamson has recast this response as an argument foreclosing any appeal to analyticity. Reconciling Quine’s epistemological holism with his treatment of the ‘deviant logician’, I show that we may discharge the demands of charitable interpretation even while attributing trivial semantic error to Williamson’s philosophers. Williamson’s effort to generalize the argument from disagreement therefore fails.

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: Analyticity; Disagreement; Epistemological holism; Williamson, Timothy Quine; Willard Van Orman;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Law
    Item ID: 8917
    Identification Number:
    Depositing User: Brian Flanagan
    Date Deposited: 18 Oct 2017 14:08
    Journal or Publication Title: Acta Analytica
    Publisher: Springer
    Refereed: Yes
    Use Licence: This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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