Dewit, Gerda, Hynes, Kate and Leahy, Dermot (2018) Corporate tax games with cross-border externalities from public infrastructure. Economic Inquiry, 56 (2). pp. 1047-1063. ISSN 0095-2583
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Abstract
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use
public infrastructure investment to attract foreign direct investment, thus enhancing
their tax bases. In doing so, we allow for cross-border infrastructural externalities.
Depending on the externality, governments are shown to strategically over- or underinvest
in infrastructure. We also examine how tax cooperation influences investment in
infrastructure and find that welfare may be lower under tax cooperation than under tax
competition; this is the case when infrastructure is very effective in raising the tax base
and generates a large negative cross-border externality
Item Type: | Article |
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Keywords: | Multinational Firms, International Business; Publicly Provided Goods; |
Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
Item ID: | 11365 |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/ecin.12516 |
Depositing User: | Gerda Dewit |
Date Deposited: | 18 Oct 2019 09:31 |
Journal or Publication Title: | Economic Inquiry |
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
Refereed: | Yes |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/id/eprint/11365 |
Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
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