Elizabeth Anscombe embarked on arguably one of her first forays into moral philosophy in a landmark article, published in 1958 at age thirty-nine, entitled ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The work can be read as the writing of a devout Catholic seeking (sceptically), for those with no religion, a coherent and practicable idea of how one ought to be so as to be fit to flourish—to, essentially, live well—as a human being. Her shift in focus away from the prevailing, yet (what she deemed) faulty, ethical theories of her day towards a virtue-based ethical naturalism (which, I argue, can be extrapolated from her notion of ‘brute facts’) is the starting point of what has come to be known as the Aretaic Turn. Philippa Foot, a friend and colleague of Anscombe, embarked on arguably one of her finest forays into moral philosophy in a milestone book, published in 2001 at age eighty (a month after Anscombe’s death), entitled Natural Goodness. The work can be seen as the writing of a card-carrying atheist seeking (determinedly), for those with no religion, a coherent and practicable idea of how one ought to be so as to be capable of flourishing as a human being. Her shift in focus away from the prevalent, yet (what she saw as) flawed, ethical theories of her time towards a virtue-based ethical naturalism (which, I contend, can also be extrapolated from Anscombe’s notion of ‘brute facts’) is a highpoint of the Aretaic Turn. This thesis argues that, in terms of developing her ethical naturalsim, Foot’s Natural Goodness, although a work justifying much merit in its own right, owes a great deal to Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ and that, in terms of her developed ethical naturalism, an examination of the concepts of belonging and vulnerability, which I provide, would be beneficial.