Share and Export
Share and Export
Dewit, Gerda and Leahy, Dermot (2004) Short-run policy commitment when investment timing is endogenour: "More harm than Good?". National University of Ireland Maynooth. (Unpublished)
![[thumbnail of N140_09_04.pdf]](https://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/style/images/fileicons/text_html.png "N140_09_04.pdf")
HTML
N140_09_04.pdf
Download (104kB)
Abstract
We introduce endogenous leadership in a game between government and firms, in which the government has short-run commitment power only and firms choose when to invest. We show that firms that delay investment in the absence of government intervention have an incentive to invest early and strategically under policy activism. Then, even though a policy scheme succeeds in correcting an existing distortion targeted by the government. it can create a new and potentially more harmful one. We investigate when the government may do better by adhering to laissez-faire than by engaging in active policy intervention.
| Item Type: | Other |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | short-run government commitment; Microeconomic policy; Endogenours policy leadership; Investment timing; Uncertainty; Laissez faire; |
| Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: | 145 |
| Depositing User: | Ms Sandra Doherty |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Sep 2004 |
| Publisher: | National University of Ireland Maynooth |
| Refereed: | No |
| URI: | https://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/id/eprint/145 |
| Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
Repository Staff Only (login required)
- Item control page
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year
