E-voting has been introduced prematurely to national elections in many countries worldwide. There are technical and organizational barriers which must be resolved before the use of e-voting can be recommended in such a critical context. Two fundamental requirements for e-voting systems are in con ict: ballot-secrecy and accuracy. We describe the nature and implications of this conflict, and examine the two main categories of proposed solutions: cryptographic voting schemes, and Voter Veried Audit Trails (VVATs). The conflict may permanently rule out the use of remote e-voting for critical elections, especially when one considers that there is no known way to reproduce the enforced privacy of a voting booth outside the supervision of a polling station. We then examine the difficulty faced by governments when they procure Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems in general, and some mitigation strategies. We go on to describe some legal implications of the introduction of e-voting, which could have serious consequences if not adequately explored, and discuss the evaluation and maintenance of systems. In the final chapters we explore two approaches to the development of requirements for e-voting.