Pérez, Dolores Álvarez and Fontela, Edelmira Neira (2006) CEO Power and CEO Stock Options Design. Irish Journal of Management, 27 (2): 1. pp. 1-24. ISSN 1649-248X
Preview
2006 issue 2 article 1.pdf
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial Share Alike.
Download (285kB) | Preview
Abstract
This paper analyses the types of stock option plans (SOPs) used to compensate the CEOs of the 115 Spanish firms that best represented the General Index of the Madrid Stock Exchange during 1999-2001. In addition, it examines the relationship between the types of stock option plans and the determinants related to managerial power theory. We find that most SOPs used in Spain offer CEOs great possibilities for gains, not always linked to the creation of real value. The results also support the hypothesis of managerial power. They suggest that the probability of plans offering the CEO high potential gains increases as: a) the participation of the majority shareholder in the firm's capital decreases; b) the participation of the nonexecutive directors in the firm's capital decreases; and c) the CEO's tenure increases.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Keywords: | Managerial Power; CEO Compensation; Stock Option Design; |
Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Business |
Item ID: | 20276 |
Depositing User: | IAM School of Business |
Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2025 20:11 |
Journal or Publication Title: | Irish Journal of Management |
Publisher: | Irish Academy of Management |
Refereed: | Yes |
URI: | https://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/id/eprint/20276 |
Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
Repository Staff Only (login required)
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year