Every working day in Ireland there are, according to the 1993 Labour Force Survey, 62 work-related accidents, injuries or other incidents damaging to health. These have resulted, among other things, in around 3,000 people being off work for more than 60 days. In 1994, 50 people lost their lives due to accidents in the workplace. It is likely that a large amount of the human suffering inherent in data like the above could be prevented by the introduction into firms of structures and systems designed to obviate work-related accidents and iU-health (WRAIH). Such structures and systems would also have another effect: a reduction of the substantial costs incurred, both directly and indirectly, as a result of WRAIH. In addition, obvious concern on the part of firms ’ owners or managers for the welfare of staff can prevent the deterioration of morale and may have a positive influence on output. It is clear from the efforts of some firms that they are aware of the need to identify and eliminate the causes of WRAIH. But the data suggest that many decision makers are unaware of the risks or, if they are aware, believe that attempting to prevent WRAIH would cost more than it would save. This article will briefly outline the reported costs of accidents in the workplace and then, using a simple game theoretic approach, will examine the choices facing the firm when deciding whether to pursue a strategy of accident prevention1. The object of the exercise is to contribute to our understanding of why some firms do, and others do not, adequately attempt to prevent WRAIH.