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O'Connor, Thomas G. and Byrne, Julie (2017) How do creditors respond to disclosure quality? Evidence from corporate dividend payouts. Working Paper. National University of Ireland Maynooth. (Unpublished)
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Abstract
Using a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries we explore how creditors influence dividend payouts in
various disclosure regimes. Poorly-protected creditors do not restrict the practice by firms in opaque
regimes of using large dividend payouts to build reputation capital, and place few restrictions on dividend
payouts in transparent regimes. In intermediate disclosure regimes creditors place large restrictions on
dividend payouts. Dividend payouts are always largest in transparent regimes. Our findings say that the
disclosure standards versions of the outcome and substitution agency models of dividends are not
mutually-exclusive, and are as effective under weak as they are under strong creditor rights.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Dividend payout; creditor rights; disclosure standards; agency outcome; substitution; model of dividends; |
| Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: | 8044 |
| Depositing User: | Thomas G. O'Connor |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Mar 2017 15:06 |
| Publisher: | National University of Ireland Maynooth |
| URI: | https://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/id/eprint/8044 |
| Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
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