Pecchenino, Rowena A. (2005) Aging, Myopia, and the Pay-As-You-Go Public Pension Systems of the G7: A Bright Future? Journal of Public Economic Theory, 7 (3). pp. 449-470. ISSN 1097-3923
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Abstract
Public pension systems of the G7 countries were established in an
era when contributors far outnumbered beneficiaries. Now, for each
beneficiary there are fewer contributors, and this trend is projected to
accelerate. To evaluate the prospects for these economies we develop
an endogenous growth overlapping generations model. We analyze
individuals’ behavior when their expectations regarding longevity are
rational or myopic, and examine whether policies exist that can offset
any adverse effects of aging. We find that while perfectly anticipated
aging is welfare improving, myopia worsens welfare, puts pension
systems at risk, and cannot be easily remedied by public policy.
“Population aging is the single most consistent pressure on federal
income security spending, as public pension spending continues its
relentless upward climb.”
Item Type: | Article |
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Keywords: | Aging; Myopia; Pay-As-You-Go; Public Pension Systems; G7; |
Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
Item ID: | 8512 |
Depositing User: | Prof. Rowena Pecchenino |
Date Deposited: | 26 Jul 2017 08:12 |
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/id/eprint/8512 |
Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
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