MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library



    Time Consistency, Learning by Doing and Infant-Industry Protection: The Linear Case


    Leahy, Dermot (1994) Time Consistency, Learning by Doing and Infant-Industry Protection: The Linear Case. The Economic and Social Review,, 26 (1). pp. 59-68. ISSN 0012-9984

    [img]
    Preview
    Download (454kB) | Preview


    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...



    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    Abstract

    This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of diiferent assumptions about precommitment in a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing. Assuming that demands are linear, we find that the optimal first-period subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with precommitment but decreasing in i t if the government cannot precommit to future subsidies. The infant-industry argument is thus reversed in the absence of precommitment.

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: Time Consistency; Learning; Infant-Industry Protection; The Linear Case;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 8477
    Depositing User: Dermot Leahy
    Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2017 15:44
    Journal or Publication Title: The Economic and Social Review,
    Publisher: Tara
    Refereed: Yes
    URI:

    Repository Staff Only(login required)

    View Item Item control page

    Downloads

    Downloads per month over past year