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Leahy, Dermot (1994) Time Consistency, Learning by Doing and Infant-Industry Protection: The Linear Case. The Economic and Social Review,, 26 (1). pp. 59-68. ISSN 0012-9984
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Abstract
This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of diiferent assumptions
about precommitment in a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing. Assuming that
demands are linear, we find that the optimal first-period subsidy is increasing in the rate of
learning with precommitment but decreasing in i t if the government cannot precommit to future
subsidies. The infant-industry argument is thus reversed in the absence of precommitment.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Time Consistency; Learning; Infant-Industry Protection; The Linear Case; |
| Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: | 8477 |
| Depositing User: | Dermot Leahy |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jul 2017 15:44 |
| Journal or Publication Title: | The Economic and Social Review, |
| Publisher: | Tara |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Related URLs: | |
| Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
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