MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library

    Politician Preferences, Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying.

    Pastine, Tuvana and Pastine, Ivan (2008) Politician Preferences, Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying. Public Choice. ISSN 0048-5829

    Download (514kB) | Preview

    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...

    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. In contrast to the previous literature where the politician has no preference over policy alternatives, we find that a more restrictive binding cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support a barely binding cap over no cap on contributions. The cap always favors the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred irrespective of the identity of the high-valuation lobbyist. The introduction of politician policy preferences permits an analysis of welfare tradeoffs of contribution caps. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.

    Item Type: Article
    Keywords: All-pay auction; campaign finance reform; explicit ceiling;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 1138
    Identification Number:
    Depositing User: Ms Sandra Doherty
    Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2009 14:02
    Journal or Publication Title: Public Choice
    Publisher: Springer Verlag
    Refereed: Yes
    Use Licence: This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

    Repository Staff Only(login required)

    View Item Item control page


    Downloads per month over past year

    Origin of downloads