MURAL - Maynooth University Research Archive Library

    Efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for general concave user utilities

    Alpcan, Tansu and Dey, Subhrakanti (2012) Efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for general concave user utilities. In: 2012 2nd Australian Control Conference. IEEE, pp. 307-312. ISBN 9781922107633

    Download (136kB) | Preview

    Share your research

    Twitter Facebook LinkedIn GooglePlus Email more...

    Add this article to your Mendeley library


    This paper introduces a novel methodology for designing efficient and strategy-proof direct mechanisms for a class of problems, where the user types are represented by smooth, concave, and increasing utility functions. Such mechanisms facilitate distributed control and allocation of resources. Hence, they are applicable to diverse problems ranging from those in communication networks to energy management. A three-step mechanism design process is presented for deriving the resource allocation and pricing functionals based on user bids in an auction setting. The properties of the resulting class of mechanisms are formally analysed using strategic (noncooperative) games. Although these mechanisms belong to the Groves class, they differ from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. The developed design process is illustrated with analytically tractable examples, which are motivated by network control problems and use scalar-parameterised logarithmic utility functions. It is shown that the resulting schemes are both efficient and truth-revealing (strategy proof) as expected.

    Item Type: Book Section
    Additional Information: Cite as: T. Alpcan and S. Dey, "Efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for general concave user utilities," 2012 2nd Australian Control Conference, 2012, pp. 307-312.
    Keywords: Efficient; Strategy-Proof Mechanisms; General Concave; User Utilities;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Science and Engineering > Electronic Engineering
    Faculty of Science and Engineering > Research Institutes > Hamilton Institute
    Item ID: 14489
    Depositing User: Subhrakanti Dey
    Date Deposited: 01 Jun 2021 15:29
    Publisher: IEEE
    Refereed: Yes
    Use Licence: This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

    Repository Staff Only(login required)

    View Item Item control page


    Downloads per month over past year

    Origin of downloads