Li, Yuzhe and Quevedo, Daniel E. and Dey, Subhrakanti and Shi, Ling (2015) Fake-Acknowledgment Attack on ACK-based Sensor Power Schedule for Remote State Estimation. In: 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, pp. 5795-5800. ISBN 978-1-4799-7886-1

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Abstract

We consider a class of malicious attacks against remote state estimation. A sensor with limited resources adopts an acknowledgement (ACK)-based online power schedule to improve the remote state estimation performance. A malicious attacker can modify the ACKs from the remote estimator and convey fake information to the sensor. When the capability of the attacker is limited, we propose an attack strategy for the attacker and analyze the corresponding effect on the estimation performance. The possible responses of the sensor are studied and a condition for the sensor to discard ACKs and switch from online schedule to offline schedule is provided.

Item Type:	Book Section
Additional Information:	Cite as: Y. Li, D. E. Quevedo, S. Dey and L. Shi, "Fake-acknowledgment attack on ACK-based sensor power schedule for remote state estimation," 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2015, pp. 5795-5800, doi: 10.1109/CDC.2015.7403130.
Keywords:	Fake Acknowledgment Attack; ACK-based; Sensor Power Schedule; Remote State Estimation;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Science and Engineering > Electronic Engineering Faculty of Science and Engineering > Research Institutes > Hamilton Institute
Item ID:	14536
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2015.7403130
Depositing User:	Subhrakanti Dey
Date Deposited:	15 Jun 2021 14:13
Publisher:	IEEE
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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