O'Hearn, Leah (2020) Being Beatvs in Catillis' Poems 9, 10, 22 and 23. The Classical Quarterly, 70 (2). pp. 691-706. ISSN 1471-6844

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Abstract

sat es beatus (Catull. 23.27) In the aggressively philosophical poem 23, Catullus attempts to change Furius’ mind about how he perceives his poverty, ‘advice’ which has been identified as either Stoic or Epicurean. Irrespective of the precise school of thought, it is clear that the poet ridicules Furius in eudaimonistic language. The poet of social commentary seeks to define the beatus uir. In fact, the term beatus has rich philosophical resonance and Catullus uses it in several other poems where attitudes to wealth form a significant backdrop to the poet's social posturing. Catullus was no philosopher. He employs the language and ideas of different schools, and, while his work does not reflect a coherent philosophical position, he was writing at a time when public discourse increasingly drew upon philosophical language and topoi. I will examine Catullus’ use of the term beatus in poems 9, 10, 22 and 23 to demonstrate that the poet draws a contrast between its different meanings across these pairs of adjacent poems. I will argue that Catullus contrasts the eudaimonistic and material meanings of the word to show the differences between clear-sighted wisdom and deceptive pleasures, between the good life and a life filled with goods.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Beatvs; Catilli; Poems;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Arts,Celtic Studies and Philosophy > Ancient Classics
Item ID:	17677
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838821000100
Depositing User:	Leah O'Hearn
Date Deposited:	13 Oct 2023 10:19
Journal or Publication Title:	The Classical Quarterly
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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