Ni, Yuqing and Ren, Xiaoqiang and Dey, Subhrakanti and Shi, Ling (2021) Remote State Estimation With a Strategic Sensor Using a Stackelberg Game Framework. IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 8 (4). pp. 1613-1623. ISSN 2325-5870

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Abstract

This article studies how to design the encoder and decoder in the context of dynamic remote state estimation with a strategic sensor. The cost of the remote estimator is the estimation error covariance, whereas the cost of the self-interested strategic sensor includes an additional term related to its private information. A Stackelberg game is employed to model the interaction between the strategic sensor and the remote estimator, where the leader (strategic sensor) first designs the encoder, and the follower (remote estimator) then determines the decoder. We derive the optimal encoder and decoder based on the mismatched cost functions, and characterize the equilibrium for some special cases. One interesting result is that the equilibrium can be achieved by transmitting nothing under certain conditions. The main results are illustrated by numerical examples.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Estimation; privacy; Stackelberg game; strategic sensor;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Science and Engineering > Research Institutes > Hamilton Institute
Item ID:	18493
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1109/TCNS.2021.3077705
Depositing User:	Subhrakanti Dey
Date Deposited:	09 May 2024 10:42
Journal or Publication Title:	IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Publisher:	IEEE
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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