Pastine, Ivan and Pastine, Tuvana (2013) Soft Money and Campaign Finance Reform. International Economic Review, 54 (4). ISSN 0020-6598

Preview

Download (242kB) | Preview

Abstract

We analyze special interest influence on policy when political contributions are capped but the regulation contains soft-money loopholes. The politician chooses between two policy options. We define special interest influence as the probability the politician chooses the policy he would not have chosen in the absence of contributions. Any binding cap reduces special interest influence but the effect may be nonmonotonic. A ban on contributions can result in greater special interest influence than a binding but nonzero cap. The results may also have implications for the policy response to the 2010 Supreme Court ruling on Citizens United v. FEC.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Soft Money; Campaign Finance; Reform;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	5691
Depositing User:	Tuvana Pastine
Date Deposited:	19 Jan 2015 15:40
Journal or Publication Title:	International Economic Review
Publisher:	Wiley
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

Repository Staff Only(login required)

Item control page

Downloads

Origin of downloads