O'Sullivan, Paul (2015) Asymmetric Doping Effects and Sanctions in Sporting Contests. Working Paper. National University of Ireland Maynooth. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

This paper analyses a one-shot game where, prior to a contest, two athletes simultaneously decide whether to engage in doping that is not certain to be detected. Doping is assumed to have at least as great a proportional effect on a naturally weaker athlete’s win probability. Given an explicit contest success function, the paper derives an optimal sanction scheme, where sanctions are identically proportional to prizes, sufficient to always induce a no-doping equilibrium. In comparison to previous papers, the winner’s optimal sanction, expressed in terms of talent and doping levels and doping costs, may be lower for all detection probabilities.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Keywords:	Asymmetric Doping Effects; Sanctions; Sporting Contests;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	6491
Depositing User:	Ms Sandra Doherty
Date Deposited:	22 Oct 2015 10:09
Publisher:	National University of Ireland Maynooth
URI:
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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