Feghhi, Saman and Leith, Douglas J.
(2014)
A First-Hop Traffic Analysis Attack Against Tor.
Working Paper.
UNSPECIFIED.
Abstract
We introduce an attack against encrypted web
traffic passing over the first hop – between client and Tor gateway
– of the Tor network. The attack makes use only of packet timing
information on the uplink and so is impervious to packet padding
defences. In addition, we show that the attack is robust against the
randomised routing used in Tor. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of the attack at identifying the web sites being visited by a Tor
user, achieving mean success rates of 68%. As well as being of
interest in its own right, this timing-only attack serves to highlight
deficiencies in existing defences and so to areas where it would be
beneficial for Tor and VPN designers to focus further attention.
| Item Type: |
Monograph
(Working Paper)
|
| Keywords: |
First-Hop; Traffic Analysis; Tor; attack; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Science and Engineering > Research Institutes > Hamilton Institute |
| Item ID: |
6964 |
| Depositing User: |
Hamilton Editor
|
| Date Deposited: |
09 Feb 2016 12:29 |
| Funders: |
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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