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    How do creditors respond to disclosure quality? Evidence from corporate dividend payouts

    O'Connor, Thomas G. and Byrne, Julie (2017) How do creditors respond to disclosure quality? Evidence from corporate dividend payouts. Working Paper. National University of Ireland Maynooth. (Unpublished)

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    Using a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries we explore how creditors influence dividend payouts in various disclosure regimes. Poorly-protected creditors do not restrict the practice by firms in opaque regimes of using large dividend payouts to build reputation capital, and place few restrictions on dividend payouts in transparent regimes. In intermediate disclosure regimes creditors place large restrictions on dividend payouts. Dividend payouts are always largest in transparent regimes. Our findings say that the disclosure standards versions of the outcome and substitution agency models of dividends are not mutually-exclusive, and are as effective under weak as they are under strong creditor rights.

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Keywords: Dividend payout; creditor rights; disclosure standards; agency outcome; substitution; model of dividends;
    Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
    Item ID: 8044
    Depositing User: Thomas G. O'Connor
    Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2017 15:06
    Publisher: National University of Ireland Maynooth
      Use Licence: This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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