Leahy, Dermot (2005) Symmetric research joint ventures: Cooperative substitutes and complements. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (5-6). pp. 381-397. ISSN 0167-7187

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Abstract

We introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of R&D. We show that the secondorder conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions already derived in the literature. Finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D, and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Bertrand and Cournot competition; Cooperative substitutes and complements; R&D; Research joint ventures; Strategic trade and industrial policy;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	8463
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.01.010
Depositing User:	Dermot Leahy
Date Deposited:	18 Jul 2017 09:45
Journal or Publication Title:	International Journal of Industrial Organization
Publisher:	Elsevier
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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