Leahy, Dermot
(1994)
Time Consistency, Learning by Doing and
Infant-Industry Protection: The Linear Case.
The Economic and Social Review,, 26 (1).
pp. 59-68.
ISSN 0012-9984
Abstract
This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of diiferent assumptions
about precommitment in a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing. Assuming that
demands are linear, we find that the optimal first-period subsidy is increasing in the rate of
learning with precommitment but decreasing in i t if the government cannot precommit to future
subsidies. The infant-industry argument is thus reversed in the absence of precommitment.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Keywords: |
Time Consistency; Learning;
Infant-Industry Protection; The Linear Case; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: |
8477 |
| Depositing User: |
Dermot Leahy
|
| Date Deposited: |
18 Jul 2017 15:44 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
The Economic and Social Review, |
| Publisher: |
Tara |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
Repository Staff Only(login required)
 |
Item control page |
Downloads per month over past year
Origin of downloads
Altmetric
Altmetric