Pecchenino, Rowena A. (1993) The Macroeconomics of Dr. Strangelove. American Economic Review, 83 (1). pp. 43-62. ISSN 0002-8282

Preview

Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper examines the weapons-accumulation decisions of two adversarial countries in the context of a deterrence / conflict initiation game embedded in an overlapping-generations model. The demographic structure permits analysis of both within -and between -country intergenerational externalities caused by past weapons-accumulation decisions, as well as of intragenerational externalities from the adversary's current weapons accumulation. Zero accumulation is a possible equilibrium with both noncooperative and cooperative behavior. Countries may also accumulate weapons to the point where conflict initiation never occurs. Pareto-improving policies are generally available, but international cooperation need not be Pareto-improving.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Macroeconomics; Dr.Strangelove;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	8520
Depositing User:	Prof. Rowena Pecchenino
Date Deposited:	26 Jul 2017 11:52
Journal or Publication Title:	American Economic Review
Publisher:	American Economic Association
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

Repository Staff Only(login required)

Item control page

Downloads

Origin of downloads