This thesis challenges the dominance of the sender-centred perspective in sanctions scholarship, which has long focused on the motivations, mechanisms, and outcomes of sanctions imposed by powerful states—particularly the United States (US). Rooted in Euro- and Atlantic-centric assumptions, this framework treats sanctions as coercive tools intended to reshape target states’ behaviour through economic disruption, political isolation, and institutional destabilisation (Mayall 1984; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Cortright and Lopez 2000; and Lektzian and Souva 2007). It prioritises how to maximise sanctions’ effectiveness. As advanced by Mohammadi and Weaver (2025), Kalb (2024), Batmanghelidj (2021), and Guter-Sandu and Kuznetsova (2020), I propose a target-centred perspective grounded in endogenous processes of adaptation and resistance within sanctioned countries, but with unique emphasis on state-society complex highlighting the internal political, social, and economic dynamics shaping a state’s ability to endure or adapt to sanctions. Central to this reorientation is the concept of resistance governance—a form of endogenous statecraft through which sanctioned states reorganise governance to preserve functionality through production, solidarity, and institutions. Resistance governance results from the interplay between top-down state strategies and bottom-up societal adaptations, generating varying levels of resistance. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Iran and Venezuela, two comparative cases illustrate this framework. Iran’s Moderate Resistance Model is sustained by a diversified economy, institutional pluralism, and a hybrid theocraticrepublican system that allows moderate adaptive flexibility. Despite clerical dominance and securitisation, Iran’s institutional adaptability and socio-political cohesion have prevented systemic collapse. In contrast, Venezuela’s Weak Resistance Model stems from oil dependency, centralised authority, and institutional fragility. While the Bolivarian project initially promoted inclusion, excessive centralisation and economic deterioration eroded its resistance. By comparing these cases, the thesis advances the concept of endogenous resistance governance, arguing that resistance under sanctions depends less on the severity of external pressure than on internal governance architecture.