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Pastine, Ivan and Pastine, Tuvana (2013) Soft Money and Campaign Finance Reform. International Economic Review, 54 (4). ISSN 0020-6598
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Abstract
We analyze special interest influence on policy when political contributions are capped but the regulation contains
soft-money loopholes. The politician chooses between two policy options. We define special interest influence as the
probability the politician chooses the policy he would not have chosen in the absence of contributions. Any binding
cap reduces special interest influence but the effect may be nonmonotonic. A ban on contributions can result in greater
special interest influence than a binding but nonzero cap. The results may also have implications for the policy response
to the 2010 Supreme Court ruling on Citizens United v. FEC.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Soft Money; Campaign Finance; Reform; |
| Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: | 5691 |
| Depositing User: | Tuvana Pastine |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Jan 2015 15:40 |
| Journal or Publication Title: | International Economic Review |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | https://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/id/eprint/5691 |
| Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
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