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Leahy, Dermot (2005) Symmetric research joint ventures: Cooperative substitutes and complements. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (5-6). pp. 381-397. ISSN 0167-7187
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Abstract
We introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use them to explain
when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of R&D. We show that the secondorder
conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive
cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions
already derived in the literature. Finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative
and non-cooperative R&D, and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only
optimal for a very limited range of parameter values.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Bertrand and Cournot competition; Cooperative substitutes and complements; R&D; Research joint ventures; Strategic trade and industrial policy; |
| Academic Unit: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: | 8463 |
| Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.01.010 |
| Depositing User: | Dermot Leahy |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jul 2017 09:45 |
| Journal or Publication Title: | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | https://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/id/eprint/8463 |
| Use Licence: | This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here |
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