Yuzhe, Li and Quevedo, Daniel E. and Dey, Subhrakanti and Shi, Ling (2017) A Game-Theoretic Approach to Fake-Acknowledgment Attack on Cyber-Physical Systems. IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks, 3 (1). pp. 1-11. ISSN 2373-776X

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Abstract

A class of malicious attacks against remote state estimation in cyber-physical systems is considered. A sensor adopts an acknowledgement (ACK)-based online power schedule to improve the remote state estimation performance under limited resources. To launch malicious attacks, the attacker can modify the ACKs from the remote estimator and convey fake information to the sensor, thereby misleading the sensor with subsequent performance degradation. One feasible attack pattern is proposed and the corresponding effect on the estimation performance is derived analytically. Due to the ACKs being unreliable, the sensor needs to decide at each instant, whether to trust the ACK information or not and adapt the transmission schedule accordingly. In the meanwhile, there is also a tradeoff for the attacker between attacking and not attacking when the modification of ACKs is costly. To investigate the optimal strategies for both the sensor and the attacker, a gametheoretic framework is built and the equilibrium for both sides is studied.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Cyber-physical systems; fake-ACK attack; game theory;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Science and Engineering > Electronic Engineering Faculty of Science and Engineering > Research Institutes > Hamilton Institute
Item ID:	11514
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1109/TSIPN.2016.2611446
Depositing User:	Subhrakanti Dey
Date Deposited:	25 Oct 2019 14:24
Journal or Publication Title:	IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks
Publisher:	IEEE
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	https://ieeexplore.ieee.org
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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